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Measuring and Managing Federal 
Financial Risk
A View from the Hill
Donald B. Marron
This timely conference began with an unusual but important question: what 
do Social Security, terrorist attacks, farm programs, Hurricane Katrina, 
private pensions, student loans, and environmental risks have in common?
The answer, as the following chapters demonstrate, is federal ﬁ  nancial 
risk. The Federal Government has established itself as perhaps the world’s 
largest provider of ﬁ  nancial services, including property and casualty insur-
ance, pensions, student loans, health insurance, mortgage insurance, and 
loan guarantees. In so doing, the government has taken on a correspond-
ingly broad range of ﬁ  nancial risks.
However, it is unclear whether policymakers and the general public fully 
appreciate the magnitude of these risks. Thus, the goal of the conference was 
to explore ways in which measurement, management, and understanding of 
these risks might be improved.
My particular charge was to provide a view from Capitol Hill. In some 
ways, that is an impossible order—no one could possibly summarize the 
views of our 535 elected representatives on Social Security, terrorism insur-
ance, farm programs, and so forth. What I can oﬀer, however, is perspective 
on how the policy process works and how information about budget impacts, 
in general, and ﬁ  nancial risk, in particular, gets analyzed, communicated, 
and used. That perspective oﬀers three particular insights.
First, the most useful techniques for measuring federal ﬁ  nancial risk will 
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be those that ﬁ  t well within the realities of the budget process. Transparency 
and ease of use, not just technical accuracy, are crucial considerations.
Legislators often design or change programs under tight budgets and tight 
deadlines. Tight budgets mean that policy development is often an iterative 
process, with legislators making repeated changes to ensure that a proposal 
neither goes above budgeted amounts (which could kill it) nor leaves money 
on the table. Tight deadlines place a premium on the scoring agencies provid-
ing scores quickly at each iteration. In that environment, simple, quick, and 
robust models often have more practical use than complex models (which 
may take hours to run) or fragile models (which may analyze a particular 
program structure extremely well but be diﬃcult to adjust when legislators 
tweak the program’s design).
Similar considerations apply at the agency level. The agencies of the exec-
utive branch take the lead in implementing federal ﬁ  nancial policies and 
in reporting their costs in the budget. Agencies do not always have access 
to the same level of ﬁ  nancial and economic sophistication that exist at, 
say, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO). For that reason, the potential 
beneﬁ  ts of sophisticated approaches to ﬁ  nancial measurement and man-
agement must sometimes be balanced against the need for implementable 
approaches.
A similar balance must also be struck between technical sophistication 
and transparency. Understandably, legislators and their staﬀs are often hesi-
tant to rely on the results of purely “black- box” models. Policymakers value 
being able to understand the rationale behind those models and their impli-
cations for budget scores. Transparent, explainable modeling approaches 
are thus particularly useful, so policymakers can understand how legislative 
changes translate into scoring changes.
Second, measures of ﬁ  nancial risk can be useful, even if they are not 
incorporated in oﬃcial budget measures. Oﬃcial budget measures carry 
great weight because of their role in the legislative process, but they are 
not the only source of budget information. The CBO, for example, often 
provides supplementary information in response to questions from inter-
ested legislators. Such information usually takes the form of additional 
detail about the assumptions underlying a particular budget score. In cases 
where ﬁ  nancial risk is an issue, however, the additional information may also 
take the form of alternative measures of the budget impact of particular 
policy changes.
During the 2005 debate over pension legislation, for example, the CBO 
prepared oﬃcial budget estimates that reﬂ  ected the somewhat arcane cash 
budgeting used for the Pension Beneﬁ  t Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).1 
However, that budgeting does not fully capture the ﬁ  nancial impacts of the 
1. See, for example, Congressional Budget Oﬃce, Cost Estimate, H.R. 2830, Pension Protection 
Act of 2005, December 2, 2005. Available at: http:/ / www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/ 69xx/ doc6935/ hr2830
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PBGC on the federal budget. In particular, it excludes the present value of 
some beneﬁ  t payments that fall outside the budget window, ignores the costs 
of ﬁ  nancial risk, and omits some impacts that are treated as nonbudgetary. 
To address these omissions, the CBO had earlier been asked to develop tech-
niques for analyzing the full ﬁ  nancial impact of the PBGC.2 In response to 
Congressional queries, the CBO was able to use those techniques to provide 
supplementary information about how proposed legislation would change 
those alternative ﬁ  nancial measures.3
The ﬁ  nancial statements of the United States are another source of ﬁ  nan-
cial information about the Federal Government.4 Those statements, which 
have received increasing attention in recent years, present the government’s 
ﬁ  nancial position using the principles of accrual accounting; the budget, in 
contrast, relies almost exclusively on cash accounting. The key diﬀerence 
between the two approaches is timing. Cash accounting records budget 
impacts when cash comes into or out of the Federal Treasury. Accrual 
accounting, on the other hand, records transactions when an economic event 
occurs (e.g., when a commitment to spend money in the future is made), 
even if the resulting cash ﬂ  ows happen in a diﬀerent year. The diﬀerence 
between these accounting approaches can be signiﬁ  cant, particularly for cer-
tain activities—for example, pensions for federal employees, claims against 
government insurance, and large capital investments—in which cash ﬂ  ows 
may be separated by many years from the moment at which key economic 
events occur.5 In recent years, the ﬁ  nancial statements have suggested that 
the ﬁ  scal situation of the Federal Government has been weaker than por-
trayed by standard budget measures, primarily because the government has 
been accruing future pension obligations to employees and veterans that are 
not reﬂ  ected in the current cash budget.
Third, it is useful to distinguish between diﬀerent elements of measur-
ing and managing ﬁ  nancial risk: uncertainty about outcomes, the spread 
of budget impacts over multiple years, the time value of money, and the 
2. Congressional Budget Oﬃce, The Risk Exposure of the Pension Beneﬁ  t Guaranty Corpo-
ration,  September  2005.  Available  at:  http:/ / www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/ 66xx/ doc6646/ 09- 15- PBGC
.pdf.
3. See, for example, Congressional Budget Oﬃce, letter to the Honorable Carolyn McCarthy 
on the net economic costs of the Pension Beneﬁ  t Guarantee Corporation, December 29, 2005. 
Available  at:  http:/ / www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/ 70xx/ doc7002/ 12- 29- PBGC.pdf.
4. The most recent statements are by the Department of the Treasury Financial Management 
Service, 2007 Financial Report of the United States Government. Available at: http:/  /  fms.treas
.gov/ fr/ 07frusg/ 07frusg.pdf.
5. For a detailed comparison of the two approaches to federal accounting, see Congressional 
Budget Oﬃce, Comparing Budget and Accounting Measures of the Federal Government’s Fis-
cal Condition,  December  2006.  Available  at:  http:/ / www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/ 77xx/ doc7701/ 12- 07
- FiscalMeasures.pdf. For a brief overview of how the two measures complement each other, see 
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cost of risk bearing. Full-  blown measurement of ﬁ  nancial risk requires 
appropriate treatment of all four of these elements. However, each of those 
elements poses challenges within traditional budgeting techniques. Improve-
ments at each level may enhance the budget process, even if all four are not 
fully addressed.
The ﬁ  rst step in addressing risk, of course, is recognizing that a range 
of future outcomes is possible. Program outlays may depend on the out-
come of future events such as the magnitude of disasters, the frequency 
of loan defaults, or the level of commodity prices. Over time, the scoring 
agencies have made substantial progress in ensuring that such uncertainty 
is reﬂ  ected in baseline projections and budget scores of policy changes. In 
projecting potential outlays under farm support programs, for example, the 
agencies do not rely on a single projection of future crop prices. Instead, 
they use a probabilistic approach that reﬂ  ects the potential distribution of 
future crop prices and the resulting distribution of farm support payments. 
That distribution can then be used to calculate the expected value of future 
payments.6
The second step in addressing risk is accounting for the fact that future 
budget impacts may be spread over multiple years. The use of ten-  year 
budget windows in the Congressional process means that the budget impacts 
of some programs are captured fully in the budget process. However, many 
programs have impacts that go beyond ten years. That is particularly com-
mon for ﬁ  nancial programs. A loan guarantee, for example, would typically 
be in place for the full life of the insured loan, which may extend for twenty 
or thirty years. This timing mismatch used to put direct loans at a substantial 
disadvantage relative to loan guarantees. A ten-  year budget window would 
typically capture all of the outlays of providing a direct loan but only some 
of the repayments; repayments outside the window would not be scored. 
Conversely, all the inﬂ  ows (from fees) from a loan guarantee would appear 
inside the window, while many outﬂ  ows (due to future defaults) would be 
ignored, because they occur outside the budget window. This imbalance 
between the length of obligations and the length of the budget windows 
was one of the driving forces behind the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 
(FCRA). Under the FCRA, many ﬁ  nancial obligations are analyzed based 
on their entire lifetime of expected cash ﬂ  ows. This framework allows a more 
balanced comparison of diﬀerent ﬁ  nancial structures.7
The third step in reﬂ  ecting ﬁ  nancial risk is accounting for the time value 
6. Congressional Budget Oﬃce, Estimating the Costs of One-  Sided Bets: How CBO Ana-
lyzes Proposals with Asymmetric Uncertainties, October 1999. Available at: http:/ / www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/ 15xx/ doc1589/ onesided.pdf.
7. For a discussion of the FCRA and its impacts, see Congressional Budget Oﬃce, Estimat-
ing the Value of Subsidies for Federal Loans and Loan Guarantees, August 2004. Available at: 
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of money for programs that stretch across multiple years. This is an area of 
weakness for standard budgeting techniques. In most cases, programs are 
evaluated based on their direct budget impacts over periods such as ﬁ  ve or 
ten years. By convention, those impacts are simply summed across years 
without any accounting of the time value of money. As a result, a proposal 
that would move $1 billion in spending from ten years in the future to today 
would be scored as having no direct budget impact over a ten-  year window, 
despite the real increase in overall spending.
That problem could be addressed in two ways. One approach would be to 
express budget impacts in terms of net present value. Scoring agencies would 
project the year- by- year budget impacts of policy proposals, just as they do 
today, but instead of simply adding up the nominal budget impacts across 
all the years in the scoring window, the agencies would use a discount rate 
(or a year- by- year series of discount rates) to determine the net present value 
of the budget impacts. Treasury interest rates would be the natural discount 
rates to use in such calculations.
That approach would incorporate the time value of money in a manner 
that is familiar to economists and ﬁ  nancial analysts but would represent a 
signiﬁ  cant break from a long-  standing tradition of focusing solely on year-
 by- year streams of nominal budget impacts. If budget policymakers wish to 
maintain that tradition, they could turn to a second approach that imputes 
the future interest costs (or savings) that would result from particular budget 
policies. In that alternative, the scoring agencies would project the direct 
year-  by-  year budget impacts of policy proposals, just as they do today, and 
then, in addition, would add a projection of the future change in govern-
ment interest payments that would result from the proposals. A proposal 
to increase spending, for example, would be scored not only as increasing 
federal outlays directly, but also as increasing the federal debt, resulting in 
higher interest payments through the end of the budget window; an increase 
in taxes would similarly be credited with reducing interest payments through 
the end of the budget window.8
It is easy to show that this approach, imputing interest costs, results in 
budget scores that are equal to the future value of program spending as mea-
sured in the last year of the budget window. In other words, this approach 
is functionally equivalent to the present value approach, except that budget 
8. This approach is already used when scoring agencies analyze the budget as a whole. The 
innovation here is suggesting that this approach could also be used for analyzing individual 
budget proposals. Doing so would yield budget projections that are perfectly consistent with 
analyses of the overall budget. When adding together the individual budget proposals, the 
imputed interest costs resulting from proposals to increase spending or reduce revenues would 
get netted against any interest savings that would result from proposals to reduce spending or 
increase revenues. Thus, the net change in interest payments imputed to the individual budget 
proposals would add up to match the change in interest payments estimated for the budget 
as a whole.26    Donald  B.  Marron
scores are expressed in terms of the budget impact in a future year (the end 
of the budget window) rather than the current year.9
These approaches would add some additional complexity to the budget 
process. Policymakers would have to become comfortable with the use of 
discounting or would have to accept the idea of adding interest costs on top 
of direct budget impacts. In either case, the beneﬁ  t would be that budgeting 
would reﬂ  ect the time value of money. At the moment, however, budget 
calculations reﬂ  ect the time value of money only for a limited set of govern-
ment programs—most notably, those that are subject to the FCRA. Under 
the FCRA, the future cash ﬂ  ows of a loan, loan guarantee, and so on are 
measured as a net present value, calculated using Treasury interest rates of 
appropriate maturity.
The ﬁ  nal stage of incorporating ﬁ  nancial risk—which has been addressed 
in very few instances—is to reﬂ  ect the cost of risk bearing. As noted in 
other chapters, this cost is usually excluded from federal budgeting. The sole 
exceptions occur in instances where doing otherwise would obviously lead to 
perverse outcomes. Thus, the federal budget records neither gains nor losses 
when the government changes the way it ﬁ  nances itself (e.g., by changing the 
maturity of the debt). Nor does it record gains or losses when the Railroad 
Retirement Fund takes inﬂ  ows and invests them in assets (e.g., corporate 
bonds) that have higher expected returns than Treasuries. When Congress 
created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), ﬁ  nally, it required that 
risk be considered when valuing the securities that the government would 
purchase under the program.
The logic underlying those budget accounting decisions is very simple: 
the government should not record a gain or loss when it trades one asset for 
another of equal value. If the government issues $1 billion in Treasuries and 
uses the proceeds to purchase $1 billion in corporate bonds, for example, the 
immediate eﬀect on the budget should be zero. The net worth of the govern-
ment is unchanged, since the value of the new asset exactly oﬀsets the value 
of the new liability. (The corporate bonds may generate proﬁ  ts over time, of 
course; the point is that they do not create those gains immediately.)
This example highlights a problem with the way that the FCRA mea-
sures the cost of federal ﬁ  nancial programs. If the FCRA were applied to 
the purchase of corporate bonds, it would show an immediate gain to the 
federal budget. Why? Because the expected return on corporate bonds is 
higher than the interest rate on Treasuries of comparable maturity. As a 
9. To illustrate, consider a simple example in which budgeting is done over a three-  year win-
dow, a proposal would increase spending by $100 in the ﬁ  rst year of the budget window, and 
the Treasury interest rate is 10 percent. In that case, the budget score would be $100 in the ﬁ  rst 
year (the spending), $10 in the second year (interest on the $100 the government had to borrow 
in the prior year to pay for the new spending), and $11 in the third year (interest on the original 
spending and on the prior year’s interest payments; in other words, the interest is compound-
ing). Adding those together, the total budget score over the window would be $121, which is 
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result, the net present value of the expected returns on the corporate bond 
(calculated using Treasury rates) would be greater than the initial cost of 
purchasing the bonds.
That perverse result occurs because of a mismatch between the discount 
rate used in the FCRA and the discount rate that ﬁ  nancial markets actually 
use to value corporate bonds. The FCRA would use Treasury rates, regard-
less of the riskiness of the bond, but ﬁ  nancial markets use discount rates 
that reﬂ  ect the bond’s ﬁ  nancial risk.
This example is important, not because the FCRA is used to value fed-
eral investments in corporate bonds (it is not), but because it is used to 
value other risky assets such as loans and loan guarantees. Like corporate 
bonds, loans and loan guarantees are risky; as a result, ﬁ  nancial markets 
value their expected cash ﬂ  ows using discount rates that incorporate a risk 
premium. Discounting their expected cash ﬂ  ows using risk-  free Treasury 
interest rates is thus likely to be misleading. The FCRA likely overstates 
the value of the loans and loan guarantees that the Federal Government 
oﬀers and thus understates the budgetary cost of providing that ﬁ  nancing.10 
That understatement could be corrected, however, if the FCRA instead used 
risk-  adjusted discount rates—that is, rates that reﬂ  ect the cost of bearing 
ﬁ  nancial risk.11
Conclusion
There is clearly room for improvement in the measurement and manage-
ment of the federal budget, generally, and in the management and report-
ing of ﬁ  nancial risk, in particular. Improvements have been made over the 
years both through statute (e.g., the FCRA) and innovations by the scoring 
agencies (e.g., use of expected values), but more remains to be done. Some 
improvements may require the use of modern ﬁ  nancial techniques—for 
example, greater use of risk-  adjusted discount rates—but signiﬁ  cant gains 
may also come from simpler changes (e.g., greater recognition of the time 
value of money).
10. Federal loans and loan guarantees usually have a positive “beta” and therefore should be 
valued using a positive risk premium. Of course, there may be instances in which loans or loan 
guarantees have a negative “beta”; in those cases, the FCRA approach would understate the 
value of the loan or loan guarantee and thus overstate the cost to the Federal Government.
11. One prominent use of risk adjustment has been in the CBO’s analysis of proposals to 
add individual accounts to Social Security. Focusing solely on the expected returns of such 
accounts would potentially be misleading, since it would not reﬂ  ect the costs of risk bearing. 
For that reason, the CBO has often used risk- adjusted returns, equal to Treasury interest rates, 
when modeling such proposals. See, for example, Congressional Budget Oﬃce, letter to the 
Honorable Max Baucus, analysis of H.R. 3304, Growing Real Ownership for Workers Act 
of 2005, September 13, 2005. Available at: http:/  /  www.cbo.gov/  ftpdocs/  66xx/  doc6645/  09-  13
- BaucusLetter.pdf.